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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE CITY, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
JAMES FRANCIS DENIER, : Case No. 20081057-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Appellant is not incarcerated 
James Denier challenges, on appeal, whether the trial court erred in allowing the 
City to present evidence in the form of hearsay in violation of Utah R. Evid. 804. 
Particularly, the trial court erred when it allowed Officer Degraw ("Degraw") to testify 
about a message left on Catherine Samuel's ("Samuel") answering machine. The trial 
court permitted Degraw to testify as to the content of that message. (R. 105:39,40.) 
However, the trial court ruled Degraw could not testify as to who left the recorded 
message. (R. 105:42.) The caller never identified himself and Degraw had not 
previously spoken with Denier. (R. 105:41.) Additionally, Denier challenges whether 
the trial court erred by ruling that the parties visitation order was not relevant to the case. 
(R. 105:102.) 
The City, in its brief, first argues the recorded message was not hearsay because it 
was not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted or was an admission by a party-
opponent. (City's Brief, 8.) In the alternative, the City then argues if the testimony was 
hearsay, it was admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule because it was a statement 
against interest. (City's Brief, 12.) Finally, the City argues the trial court properly 
limited questions regarding the visitation order because the order was not relevant but if 
an err occurred it was ultimately cured. (City's Brief, 16.) 
POINT L DEGRAW'S TESTIMONY REGARDING THE STATEMENTS LEFT 
ON SAMUEL'S ANSWERING MACHINE DOES NOT FALL UNDER THE 
EXCEPTION TO ADMISSION OF HEARSAY, STATEMENT AGAINST 
INTEREST. 
The City argues Degraw's testimony regarding the statements left on Samuel's 
machine, if considered hearsay, falls under an exception to the hearsay rule, (City's 
Brief, 12.) particularly, Utah Rule of Evidence 804 (b)(3). (Id.) The rule provides that if, 
at the time the statement was made, "it so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or 
criminal liability . . . that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have 
made the statement unless believing it to be true", it is admissible. Utah Rule of Evid. 
804 (b)(3). However, for the exception to apply, the declarant must be unavailable. Id. 
Unavailability as a witness includes situations in which the declarant "is exempted 
by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the subject 
matter of the declarant's statement..." Utah Rule of Evid. 804 (a)(1). "The Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination "... comes into operation only where a 
specific question is asked." State v. White, 671 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1983) citing State In 
Interest of P.L.L., 597 P.2d 886, 889 (Utah 1979) (footnote omitted), (citation omitted). 
"An attorney for a witness cannot claim a privilege against self-incrimination; he can 
only advise the witness." State v. Anderson, 495 P.2d 804, 806 (Utah 1972) (citation 
omitted). "In order for the claim to be honored by the court, it must be made by the 
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witness." Id. at 806 (citation omitted). See also State v. White, 671 P.2d 191 (Utah 
1983) (citation omitted). 
The City argues Denier was unavailable due to privilege and as a result the 
statements left on Samuel's machine were admissible. (City's Brief, 12). In White, the 
defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery. State v. White, 671 P.2d 191 (Utah 
1983) (citation omitted). During the jury trial, defense counsel called an inmate in the 
Salt Lake County Jail to testify. Id. at 192 (citation omitted). The inmate testified that he 
was acquainted with another inmate that had talked about White and about a robbery. Id. 
However, when defense counsel asked further about the conversation, the State objected 
on grounds of hearsay. Id. Defense counsel asserted that the inmate who made the 
statement would invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege. Id. Ultimately, the Court 
determined that the party in question must take the stand and personally assert that right 
for him to be deemed unavailable. Id. at 193 (citation omitted). 
Unlike White, when Degraw testified, it was unclear if Denier would testify; 
defense counsel never stated he would invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege nor did 
Denier take the stand and invoke it. In fact, the defendant ultimately took the stand and 
testified on his own behalf. He was available and therefore the hearsay exception, 
statement against interest, is inapplicable. 
However, even if the defendant was unavailable, Degraw's testimony regarding 
what was said on the recorded message should have been excluded because Degraw 
could not identify the caller. Officer Degraw responded to Samuel's house and listened 
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to the message. (R. 105:68.) He had never spoken to the complaining witness prior to 
this incident. The trial court determined that Degraw could not identify the caller 
because Degraw had neither spoken with Denier nor met him prior to this incident. (R. 
105:41.) 
The City asserts that "Samuel's testimony at the trial prior to Degraw's testimony 
provided corroboration that was trustworthy as she had heard the statements herself, she 
knew Denier for fourteen years, had spoken to him numerous time and knew his voice." 
(City's Brief, 13.) However, Degraw must establish who made the statement because he 
is the one testifying. The exception cannot be applied unless the caller can be identified 
and in this case the trial court determined that Degraw could not identify the caller. (R. 
105:42.) 
Finally, the statements made were not against the caller's interest. Any 
statement's made, when determining whether they are against a person's penal interest, 
are taken as a whole. State v. Webster, 2001 UT App 238, % 14, 32 P.3d 976 (citation 
omitted). 
In Webster, the defendant was convicted in the Third District Court for wrongful 
appropriation of a motor vehicle. Webster at ^ 14. During trial, statements made by the 
defendant's wife to a detective were admitted under the hearsay exception Utah Rule of 
Evidence 804 (b), statement against interest. Id. at ^ 14. The defendant's wife told the 
detective that her husband had driven the car in question two days prior to it being 
recovered. Id. at ^ 15. When the detective told her the defendant denied ever driving the 
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car, she stated "we have a problem." Id. On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals 
concluded the statement made was not against her penal interest and therefore was not 
admissible in court. Id. at ^ f 15. Her statements "were fully consistent with her own penal 
interest" Id. at % 15. 
Like Webster, the statements made were not against the defendant's penal interest. 
Degraw testified the male caller stated he knew this call was being recorded and he was 
talking about complaints that had been filed over the last eight or nine years. (R. 105:70.) 
He further stated that "this is about our son, not about you, not about me." The protective 
order prohibited contact between the parties with the exception of any contact regarding 
the visitation of their son. (R. 105:55.) The caller stated that this call was about their son 
and therefore the contact would not have been a violation of the protective order. (R. 
105:55.) What Degraw heard, alone, would not be a statement against interest even if he 
could have identified the caller. 
POINT II. THE VISITATION ORDER WAS RELEVANT AND THE ERROR 
WAS NOT CURED BY DENIER'S TESTIMONY. 
The City argues the trial court did not err in excluding defense counsel's questions 
regarding the party's visitation order. (City's Brief, 13 and 16.) In support of their 
argument, the City argues the visitation order was irrelevant as it did not pertain to the 
violation of the protective order (City's Brief, 16.) and the message left on Samuel's 
telephone did not discuss visitation or custody. Id. Finally, the City argues that if there 
was an error it was cured when Denier testified that he had visitation every Wednesday 
and every other weekend. Id. 
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The error was not cured when Denier took the stand. Previously, Samuel testified 
that "there's nothing in my order that stipulates that I have to tell him when I go out of 
town with my child" and further testified she felt Denier was harassing her. (R. 105:49; 
R. 51:8-10.) (R. 105:102.) Denier did testify to what he thought the current situation 
was. (R. 105:96.) He sees his son once or twice a year as "far as holidays are concerned" 
(R. 105:96.) That testimony was with regards to the "current situation." (R. 105:96.) 
However, the visitation order was ultimately the legally binding document. If the 
visitation order permitted Denier to call their son during the holidays or ordered the 
parties to contact the other when they leave the state, it would have gone to the weight of 
Denier's testimony. It would have explained why Denier was inquiring where their son 
was and that the phone calls were an attempt to harass or violate the protective order but 
were within the limits of the visitation order and the protective order. Merely discussing 
what Denier's understanding of the current situation was not sufficient to remedy the trial 
court's error in not allowing him to discuss the actual visitation order. 
CONCLUSION 
Denier respectfully requests that this Court reverse the conviction and remand this 
case for a new trial. 
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